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INTRODUCTION
Imagine trying to patent a soufflé, using only the recipe to
define what it is. If you have never seen a soufflé, you would not
necessarily know how to identify it based on the recipe used to
make it. You would only describe a soufflé in this manner if you
lacked the words to describe the structural characteristics, such as
size, density, and other appropriate measures. What happens if the
recipe only describes soufflés that are four inches in diameter?
Should you be able to assert that you have described every type of
soufflé that can be made?
This is the problem that courts have struggled with for many
years with regard to product-by-process claim construction. These
claims use the process by which a product is created to define the
invention, instead of just claiming the structural elements as a
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typical product claim would.1 The patent statutes do not
specifically allow for product-by-process claims—they are a
creation of the Patent Office and the courts.2 Recently, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“Federal Circuit”)
again attempted to address the issue of product-by-process claim
construction, but failed to give much clarity or correctness to the
subject.3 In fact, the two judges of the Federal Circuit that have
advocated differing approaches to product-by-process claim
construction have both called for an en banc decision to decide this
controversial issue.4 Much of the problem with these claims is the
inherent ambiguity when claiming the invention of a product in
process language. This Note will discuss the ways that courts have
grappled with this problem and will suggest a path out of the
current legal morass.
Product-by-process claims are an acceptable form of claiming
an invention in U.S. patent law.5 These claims are used to define
an invention when the structural elements are more difficult to
claim.6 However, these claims are often avoided because the
Federal Circuit has issued conflicting decisions in the Scripps
Clinic and Atlantic Thermoplastics cases regarding the scope of
these types of claims.7 Separate panels of the Federal Circuit
issued these two decisions sixteen months apart, and the en banc
Federal Circuit reviewed neither case.8 Some district courts have
applied the first decision because the first decision of two
conflicting decisions is binding precedent. Other courts have
1

U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Manual of Patent Examining Procedure, § 2113
(8th ed., rev. 4 2005) [hereinafter MPEP].
2
See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).
3
See SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 439 F.3d 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2006),
reh’g en banc denied, 453 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
4
SmithKline, 453 F.3d at 1347 (Newman, J., and Rader, J., dissenting separately from
the denial of rehearing en banc).
5
MPEP, supra note 1.
6
3 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 8.05 (2006).
7
Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1583 (Fed. Cir.
1991) (holding that product-by-process claims “are not limited to product prepared by the
process set forth in the claims”); Atl. Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp. 970 F.2d 834,
846–47 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (holding that “process terms in product-by-process claims serve
as limitations in determining infringement”), reh’g en banc denied, 974 F.2d 1279 (Fed.
Cir. 1992).
8
Atl. Thermoplastics, 974 F.2d 1279 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (rehearing en banc denied).
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found the rationale in the second case more compelling.9 Quite
obviously, this has created great uncertainty in the law, making the
scope of product-by-process claims ill-defined.10
Claim construction has always been one of the most hotly
contested areas of patent law because every patent infringement
lawsuit requires figuring out what the invention actually is.11 After
the Markman decision, claim construction is a matter of law,
normally determined during a hearing before a jury is
empanelled.12 The recent decision in Phillips v. AWH eliminated a
primary focus on dictionary definitions to determine the scope of
claims and reaffirmed the central role of the specification in
helping courts determine the actual scope of patent protection.13
But what these decisions have not done is create more certainty for
claim construction at the District Court level. According to one
study, claim construction is reversed on appeal 34.5% of the
time.14
Despite the inherent ambiguities in product-by-process claims,
certain industries have a special interest in claiming their
inventions using product-by-process language. One industry
where product inventions are often described in process language
is the pharmaceutical industry.15 By defining compounds by their
9

For cases that follow Scripps, see, for example, Aventis Pharms., Inc. v. Barr Labs.,
Inc., 372 F. Supp. 2d 430 (D.N.J. 2005); Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Armstrong World
Indus., Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 594 (D. Del. 2002); Trs. of Columbia Univ. v. Roche
Diagnostics GmbH, 126 F. Supp. 2d 16 (D. Mass. 2000); DeKalb Genetics Corp. v.
Northrup King Co., No. 96 C 50169, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14275 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 14,
1997) (marked not for publication). For cases that follow Atlantic Thermoplastics, see,
for example, Kennametal, Inc. v. Cerametal S.A.R.L., No. 99-CV-74678-DT, 2001 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 25284 (E.D. Mich. May 10, 2001); Tropix, Inc. v. Lumigen, Inc., 825 F.
Supp. 7 (D. Mass. 1993); Fairfax Dental Ltd. v. Sterling Optical Corp., 808 F. Supp. 326
(S.D.N.Y. 1992).
10
CHISUM, supra note 6.
11
Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 396 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
12
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 981 (Fed. Cir. 1995), aff’d,
517 U.S. 370 (1996).
13
Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
14
Kimberly A. Moore, Markman Eight Years Later: Is Claim Construction More
Predictable?, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 231, 233 (2005).
15
Mark D. Passler, Product-By-Process Patent Claims: Majority of the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit Forgets Purpose of the Patent Act, 49 U. MIAMI L. REV.
233, 234 (1994).
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method of manufacture or synthesis, the inventor is hedging his bet
as to which claims would actually stand up during an infringement
suit.16 When there are hundreds of millions, if not billions, of
dollars on the line when a drug loses patent protection, product-byprocess claims can often become crucial.17
The controversy over product-by-process claiming also
highlights unique issues of appellate procedure and faithfulness to
precedent. The Federal Circuit is unique in that its appellate
jurisdiction is not limited by geography, but by subject matter.18
When Congress created the Federal Circuit in 1982, it wanted to
create a court that would set national standards, especially in patent
law.19 Disagreement among the other circuits usually aids the
evolution of national standards, as the Supreme Court benefits
from the deliberation and analysis of the several courts in
ultimately reaching its decision.20 But for the Federal Circuit,
there should never be a situation akin to a circuit split.21 Any
conflicting precedent should be resolved by the en banc court.22
However, when the Atlantic Thermoplastics case was appealed for
en banc review, the full court refused to hear the case, with the
dissenters possessing a completely different interpretation of the
scope of the controlling precedent of the Scripps case.23 So not
only did two conflicting precedents arise out of the two decisions,
but the court was also split on the procedural aspect of how
conflicting precedents should be resolved.24 The recent decision in

16

See In re Hughes, 496 F.2d 1216, 1219 (C.C.P.A. 1974).
Passler, supra note 15, at 234.
18
28 U.S.C.S. § 1295(a)(1) (2006).
19
S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 1 (1981), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 11.
20
See, e.g., Judicial and Admin. Review of Immigration Decisions: Testimony before
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2006) (testimony of Prof. David A. Martin),
available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=1845&wit_id=673 (arguing
against placing immigration appeals within the jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit).
21
S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 3 (1981), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 13 (stating
that the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction is defined in terms of subject matter, rather than
geography).
22
FED. CIR. R. 35(a).
23
Atl. Thermoplastics, Co., 974 F.2d 1279.
24
Id.
17
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SmithKline Beecham v. Apotex has done little to resolve the
conflicts between the two decisions.25
Though there are situations where product-by-process claims
are needed, this method of claiming is such an inferior way to
claim an invention that every effort should be made to exclude the
practice from use. For claims that already exist, there should be a
renewed emphasis on whether or not the invention was
distinctively described. These issues of law will have to be
decided by the Federal Circuit en banc, the Supreme Court or by
an act of Congress. Another contradictory panel decision would
only serve to further muddy the waters in an already murky area of
patent jurisprudence. This would restore much of the balance
missing in today’s product-by-process claim construction
jurisprudence.
Part I of this Note will discuss the current state of product-byprocess claim construction case law. Part II will examine why that
precedent is hopelessly contradictory. Finally, Part III will argue
for a newly restrictive regime where product-by-process claims are
strongly disfavored, with an eye to foreign patent systems as a
guide for the U.S. patent system.
I. THE HISTORY OF PRODUCT-BY-PROCESS CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
A. Supreme Court Precedent
There is a series of cases from the 1880s that do have some
relevance for any discussion of product-by-process claims.
However, since these decisions antedate so much of the modern
techniques of patent drafting, much of their precedential weight is
undercut.
In Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Co. v. Davis, the Supreme Court
reviewed an infringement suit where the product claim had a
reference to the process used to make it in the specification.26 The

25
26

See SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 439 F.3d 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Co. v. Davis, 102 U.S. 222, 223 (1880).
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patent concerned a set of dentures made out of vulcanized rubber27
where the specification described the process used to make it.28
The defendant made a set of dentures out of celluloid, which did
not require vulcanization.29 The court held: “[c]elluloid is not an
equivalent for the material which the patent makes essential to the
invention, and in the use of it for a dental plate, the process which
is inseparable from the invention is not, and cannot be,
employed.”30 The court read the process limitations into the claim,
even though the products were distinguishable.
Four years later, the Supreme Court reviewed another claim
similar to modern product-by-process claims.31 Here, the Supreme
Court analyzed a patent for an artificially made dye that can also
be found in nature.32 The claim covered the dye itself and it
referenced a particular method for making it.33 The patentee sued
another patent holder that had made the same dye, but instead used
an entirely different process.34 The Court held that:
[U]nless it is shown that the process of No. 4,321
[plaintiff’s patent] was followed to produce the defendant’s
article, or unless it is shown that that article could not be
produced by any other process, the defendant’s article
cannot be identified as the product of the process of No.
4,321. Nothing of the kind is shown.35

27

“Vulcanization, or curing of rubber, is a chemical process in which individual
polymer molecules are linked to other polymer molecules by atomic bridges. The end
result is that the springy rubber molecules become cross-linked to a greater or lesser
extent. This makes the bulk material harder, much more durable and also more resistant
to chemical attack. It also makes the surface of the material smoother and prevents it
from sticking to metal or plastic chemical catalysts.” WIKIPEDIA, Vulcanization,
http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Vulcanization&oldid=75592500 (last visited
Sept. 13, 2006).
28
Goodyear, 102 U.S. at 222.
29
Id. at 228–29.
30
Id. at 230.
31
Cochrane v. Badische Anilin & Soda Fabrik, 111 U.S. 293 (1884).
32
Id. at 294–96.
33
Id. at 296.
34
Id. at 310.
35
Id.
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The Court also went on to give an alternative holding.36 There,
the Court said that the dye itself was not patentable because the
dye constituted prior art to the plaintiff’s patent.37 Thus, the Court
held that the patent was for the novel process used to make the
dye.38
Three years later, in the Plummer case, the Court looked again
at a version of product-by-process claiming.39 The patent at issue
in this case was for “‘the new manufacture hereinabove described,
consisting of iron ornamented in imitation of bronze by the
application of oil and heat, substantially as described.’”40 But
because of a process already known in the prior art, the Court held
that the patent for the product was only novel because of the
process used to make it.41 Thus, the only way to construe the
patent as not anticipated necessarily implied that there was no
infringement.42 The Court did not lay down a blanket rule that all
product-by-process claims are novel; rather, the Court held that a
process limitation had to be read into this claim to make it novel.
B. Patentability and the P.T.O.
Following United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
(“C.C.P.A.,” a forerunner court to the Federal Circuit that had
jurisdiction over appeals from the Patent Office) and Federal
Circuit precedent, the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(“P.T.O.”) follows the rule that “product-by-process claims are not
limited to the manipulations of the recited steps, only the structure
implied by the steps.”43 The P.T.O. also cites In re Thorpe for the
rule that:
[E]ven though product-by-process claims are limited by
and defined by the process, determination of patentability is
based on the product itself. The patentability of a product
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43

Id. at 311–13.
Id. at 311.
See id. at 310–12.
Plummer v. Sargent, 120 U.S. 442 (1887).
Id. at 445 (quoting the text of the patent application).
Id. at 449.
Id.
MPEP, supra note 1, § 2113.
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does not depend on its method of production. If the
product in the product-by-process claim is the same as or
obvious from a product of the prior art, the claim is
unpatentable even though the prior product was made by a
different process.44
This rule is consistent with the maxim that claims should be
given their broadest possible interpretation when examining their
patentability.45 These rules balance two competing public policy
goals of the P.T.O. On one hand, giving proposed claims their
broadest possible interpretation “reduce[es] the possibility that
claims, finally allowed, will be given broader scope than is
justified . . . .”46 On the other hand, it is not unfair to applicants,
because “‘before a patent is granted the claims are readily amended
as part of the examination process.’”47
Prior to this current rule, the C.C.P.A. had a long debate over
whether or not product-by-process claiming could be used when
the product could only be described in process language, the socalled “Rule of Necessity.”48 This rule is now less strictly
enforced, but much of the debate over the scope of the rule greatly
informs the current problems the Federal Circuit faces in
determining the scope of product-by-process claims.
The Rule of Necessity originated in a decision on patentability
by the Commissioner of Patents in 1891.49 In Painter, the product
was defined “wholly by the process of making it.”50 While
acknowledging that as a general rule “a claim for an article of
manufacture should not be defined by the process of producing that
article,”51 the Commissioner held:
When the case arises that an article of manufacture is a new
thing, a useful thing, and embodies invention, and that
article cannot be properly defined and discriminated from
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51

Id. (citing In re Thorpe, 777 F.2d 695, 698 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
See, e.g., In re Hyatt, 211 F.3d 1367, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
Id. (citing In re Yamamoto, 740 F.2d 1569, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
Id. (quoting Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Quigg, 822 F.2d 1581, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1987)).
CHISUM, supra note 6, § 8.05[2][a].
Ex parte Painter, 1891 C.D. 200, 57 O.G. 999 (Dec. Comm’r Pat. 1891).
Id. at 200, 57.O.G. at 999.
Id., 57 O.G. at 999.
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the prior art otherwise than by reference to the process of
producing it, a case is presented which constitutes a proper
exception to the rule.52
This was the rule cited by the Patent Office in one form or
another prior to the adoption of the major revisions of U.S. patent
law in 1952.53
Following the adoption of the 1952 Act,54 the C.C.P.A. could
not settle on one rule for the patentability of product-by-process
claims for over twenty years.55 In In re Steppan, the C.C.P.A. held
that there was no statutory basis to sustain the Rule of Necessity.56
One year later, the C.C.P.A. reaffirmed the Rule of Necessity,
holding that “a claim for an article capable of such definition must
define the article by its structure and not by the process of making
it.”57 Two years later, after deciding Steppan, the C.C.P.A. did not
specifically reject the Rule of Necessity, but cited Steppan
favorably in holding that the applicant met the requirement of 35
U.S.C. § 112 that the invention be distinctively claimed.58 Finally,
Hughes did not specifically reject the Rule of Necessity, but said
that it was not founded on section 112.59 Instead, it refused to
reject the rule because it had such a sound policy justification.60

52

Id. at 201, 57 O.G. at 1000.
See In re Lifton, 189 F.2d 261 (C.C.P.A. 1951); In re Shortell, 173 F.2d 993
(C.C.P.A. 1949); In re Moeller, 117 F.2d 565 (C.C.P.A. 1941); In re McKee, 95 F.2d 264
(C.C.P.A. 1938); In re Dreyfus, 75 F.2d 501 (C.C.P.A. 1935); In re Grupe, 48 F.2d 936
(C.C.P.A. 1931); In re Butler, 37 F.2d 623 (C.C.P.A. 1930); In re Brown, 29 F.2d 873
(D.C. Cir. 1928); Ex parte Fesenmeier, 1922 C.D. 18, 302 O.G. 199, (Dec. Comm’r Pat.
1922).
54
Bryson Act, Pub. L. No. 82-593, 66 Stat. 792 (1952).
55
In re Hughes, 496 F.2d 1216 (C.C.P.A. 1974); In re Pilkington, 411 F.2d 1345
(C.C.P.A. 1969); In re Johnson, 394 F.2d 591 (C.C.P.A. 1968); In re Steppan, 394 F.2d
1013 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
56
Steppan, 394 F.2d at 1019.
57
Johnson, 394 F.2d at 594.
58
Pilkington, 411 F.2d at 1349–50.
59
Hughes, 496 F.2d at 1218.
60
Id.
53
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C. The Scripps Decision
The Scripps case concerned an infringement suit over a patent
for a protein essential to blood clotting, Human Factor VIII:C.61
The claim at issue in the case was: “[h]ighly purified and
concentrated human or porcine VIII:C prepared in accordance with
the method of claim 1.”62 At issue with regard to the product-byprocess claims was the district court’s denial of summary judgment
for infringement of these claims.63 The court (with an opinion
written by Judge Pauline Newman) then cited a number of
C.C.P.A. decisions on patentability for the proposition that “[the
rule that] product-by-process claims would not be infringed unless
the same process were practiced . . . appears to diverge from our
precedent.”64 The court then held:
In determining patentability we construe the product as not
limited by the process stated in the claims. Since claims
must be construed the same way for validity and for
infringement, the correct reading of product-by-process
claims is that they are not limited to product prepared by
the process set forth in the claims.65
As a result, the court ruled that summary judgment was
incorrect and remanded to the district court.66
61

Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1568 (Fed. Cir.
1991).
62
Id. at 1570. Claim 1 was:
1. An improved method of preparing Factor VIII procoagulant activity protein
comprising the steps of
(a) adsorbing a VIII:C/VIII:RP complex from a plasma or commercial
concentrate source onto particles bound to a monoclonal antibody specific
to VIII:RP,
(b) eluting the VIII:C,
(c) adsorbing the VIII:C obtained in step (b) in another adsorption to
concentrate and further purify same,
(d) eluting the adsorbed VIII:C, and
(e) recovering highly purified and concentrated VIII:C.
Id.
63
Id. at 1583.
64
Id. (citing In re Thorpe, 777 F.2d 695 (Fed. Cir. 1985); In re Brown, 459 F.2d 531,
535 (C.C.P.A. 1972); In re Bridgeford, 357 F.2d 679, 682 n.5 (C.C.P.A. 1966)).
65
Id.
66
Id. at 1584.
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D. The Atlantic Thermoplastics Case
Sixteen months after the Scripps decision, a different threejudge panel of the Federal Circuit handed down another decision
that hinged on the construction of product-by-process claims.67 In
Atlantic Thermoplastics v. Faytex, the court examined the appeal
of a trial verdict that held the Faytex Corporation liable for
infringement of Atlantic Thermoplastics’ patent for a shockabsorbing innersole.68 The claim at issue was: “The molded
innersole produced by the method of claim 1.”69 The district court
held that because the process that Faytex used was different from
the process included in Atlantic Thermoplastics’ product-byprocess claim, Faytex did not infringe the product-by-process
claim.70
However, in deciding the infringement issue, this Federal
Circuit panel refused to use the rule of Scripps and instead stated in
a footnote, “[a] decision that fails to consider Supreme Court
precedent does not control if the court determines that the prior
panel would have reached a different conclusion if it had
considered controlling precedent. For the reasons set forth below,
we necessarily so conclude.”71 The court then evaluated a series of
Supreme Court and C.C.P.A. decisions and concluded, “[I]n both
67

Atl. Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp., 970 F.2d 834 (Fed. Cir. 1992), reh’g en
banc denied, 974 F.2d 1279 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
68
Id. at 835.
69
Id. at 836. The method of Claim 1 was:
(a) introducing an expandable, polyurethane into a mold; and
(b) recovering from the mold an innersole which comprises a contoured heel
and arch section composed of a substantially open-celled polyurethane foam
material, the improvement which comprises:
(i) placing an elastomeric insert material into the mold, the insert material
having greater shock-absorbing properties and being less resilient than the
molded, open-celled polyurethane foam material, and the insert material
having sufficient surface tack to remain in the placed position in the mold
on the introduction of the expandable polyurethane material so as to
permit the expandable polyurethane material to expand about the insert
material without displacement of the insert material; and
(ii) recovering a molded innersole with the insert material having a tacky
surface forming a part of the exposed bottom surface of the recovered
innersole. Id. at 835–36.
70
Id. at 836.
71
Id. at 838–39 n.2 (citations omitted).
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patentability actions before the CCPA and infringement actions
before the Supreme Court or the regional circuits, the courts
regarded the process language in product-by-process claims as
limiting the claim.”72 But the court also noted that prior precedent
with regard only to patentability set forth the rule that, “even
though product-by-process claims are limited by and defined by
the process, determination of patentability is based on the product
itself.”73 Thus, the court held that process steps form claim
limitations for the purposes of infringement, the court affirmed the
ruling of the district court and found that Faytex did not infringe
the product-by-process claim.74
The Atlantic Thermoplastics decision provoked an
extraordinarily heated response when the Federal Circuit rejected a
petition to rehear the case before the en banc court.75 Judges Nies,
Rich, Newman and Lourie all filed dissenting opinions against the
denial of en banc review.76 Judge Nies expressed no opinion on
the merits of either side’s arguments, but did vote for the en banc
court to hear the case.77 Judge Rich blasted the panel both for
being wrong in its claim interpretation, but worst of all totally
ignoring the precedential rules of the court.78 Judge Rich wrote
that the footnote describing the panel’s reason why it chose not to
follow the Scripps decision was “not only insulting to the Scripps
panel (Chief Judge Markey, Judge Newman and a visiting judge),
it is mutiny. It is heresy. It is illegal.”79 Judge Rich also added a
comment that has guided many lower courts that have evaluated

72

Id. at 845.
Id.
74
Id. at 847.
75
Atl. Thermoplastics, 974 F.2d 1279.
76
Id. Federal Circuit rules require that attorneys acting on behalf of their clients
include one of two statements when asking for an en banc rehearing: “Based on my
professional judgment, I believe the panel decision is contrary to the following
decision(s) of the Supreme Court of the United States or the precedent(s) of this court:
(cite specific decisions). [or] Based on my professional judgment, I believe this appeal
requires an answer to one or more precedent-setting questions of exceptional importance:
(set forth each question in a separate sentence).” FED CIR. R. 35(b)(2).
77
Atl. Thermoplastics, 974 F.2d at 1280 (Nies, J., dissenting on the denial of rehearing
en banc).
78
Id. at 1280–81 (Rich, J., dissenting on the denial of rehearing en banc).
79
Id. at 1281.
73
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product-by-process claims, stating that, “[f]ortunately, this court
has another rule—as yet to be ignored by a panel, I believe—that
where there are conflicting precedents, the earlier precedent
controls. But the conflict should have been eliminated in banc to
avoid confusion in the law.”80 Judge Lourie (joined by Judges
Rich and Newman) also questioned both the way that the panel
addressed the precedential weight of the Scripps decision81 and the
breadth of its holding on process steps informing claim
limitations.82
Judge Newman’s dissent (joined by Judges Rich and Lourie) is
the most interesting here because she filed opinions in all of the
three most recent cases on product-by-process claims.83 She first
identified the Atlantic Thermoplastics claim as not a true productby-process claim.84 She suggested a three-tiered classification
scheme for claims that have process elements:
(1) [W]hen the product is new and unobvious, but is not
capable of independent definition; (2) when the product is
old or obvious, but the process is new; (3) when the product
is new and unobvious, but has a process-based limitation
(e.g. a “molded” product). Type (2) includes the Atlantic
class of claim; such claims are examined as process claims,
their validity depends on the novelty and unobviousness of
the process, and they are infringed only when the process is
used. Type (1) is the Scripps class of claim; such claims are
examined as product claims, their validity depends on the
novelty and unobviousness of the product, and they are
infringed by the product however made. Indeed, claims of
types (2) and (3) are not properly called “product-by80

Id.
“[I]t is contrary to our case law and procedures for a panel to act contrary to a prior
precedent of this court. If this panel thought Scripps was wrongly decided (and I do not),
it was either bound to follow our precedents or to seek an in banc review.” Id. at 1298
(citation omitted) (Lourie, J., dissenting on the denial of rehearing en banc).
82
Id. at 1298–99.
83
See SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 439 F.3d 1312, 1321 (Fed. Cir.
2006) (Newman, J., dissenting); Atl. Thermoplastics, 974 F.2d at 1281 (Newman, J.,
dissenting on the denial of rehearing en banc); Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v.
Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
84
Atl. Thermoplastics, 974 F.2d at 1282.
81
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process” claims, if that term is used with precision.85
(footnote omitted)
Judge Newman then specifically rebutted each of the cases that
the panel cited as precedent to bolster this three-tier scheme.86 In
Judge Newman’s view, by classifying the claims in Scripps and
Atlantic Thermoplastics as distinguishable, there was no need for
the Atlantic Thermoplastics panel to determine that there was a
conflict with Supreme Court precedent.87
E. District Court Decisions after Scripps and Atlantic
Thermoplastics
District courts have not consistently followed either the Scripps
decision or the Atlantic Thermoplastics decision.88 These district
court opinions exemplify how difficult it is to make any
meaningful distinction between the two decisions.89
This
subsection examines how district courts have applied these
conflicting rules.
85

Id. at 1284. See also Eric P. Mirabel, Product-by-Process Claims: A Practical
Perspective, 68 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 3 (1986).
86
Atl. Thermoplastics, 974 F.2d at 1285–97.
87
Id. at 1283.
88
For cases that follow Scripps, see, for example, Aventis Pharms., Inc. v. Barr Labs.,
Inc., 372 F. Supp. 2d 430 (D.N.J. 2005); Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Armstrong World
Indus., Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 594 (D. Del. 2002); Trs. of Columbia Univ. v. Roche
Diagnostics GmbH, 126 F. Supp. 2d 16 (D. Mass. 2000); DeKalb Genetics Corp. v.
Northrup King Co., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14275 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (marked not for
publication). For cases that follow Atlantic Thermoplastics, see, for example,
Kennametal, Inc. v. Cerametal s.a.r.l., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25284 (E.D. Mich. 2001);
Tropix, Inc. v. Lumigen, Inc., 825 F. Supp. 7 (D. Mass. 1993); Fairfax Dental Ltd. v.
Sterling Optical Corp., 808 F. Supp. 326 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
89
In fact, many courts have expressed frustration at the lack of guidance that the
Federal Circuit has provided for this type of claim construction. See Trs. of Columbia
Univ., 126 F. Supp. 2d at 32 (“Plainly, the law on this issue is in a state of uncertainty.
By denying the rehearing en banc, not only are lower courts left with little guidance, but
so are the inventors and investors of the biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries
who must make research and development decisions not knowing how much protection is
available to a claim for a novel biological or chemical product.”); DeKalb Genetics
Corp., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14275, at *5–6 (“It cannot be questioned that there is a
direct conflict between the rule enunciated in Scripps and the one set forth in Atlantic
Thermoplastics.”); Tropix, 825 F. Supp. at 8 (“Unfortunately, the judges of the Federal
Circuit Court are in open disagreement on the point, making such a prediction
hazardous.”).
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1. District Court Rulings That Follow Scripps
At least four district court rulings have sided with the Scripps
court.90 Most recently, in Aventis Pharmaceuticals, the court ruled
on a defendants’ summary judgment motion based on the
invalidity of the product-by-process claims at issue in the suit.91
The court opted to follow the Scripps decision because it was the
earlier precedent.92 That rationale was also compelling for the
Trustees of Columbia University and DeKalb Genetics cases.93 In
Mannington Mills, the court found the Scripps decision more
compelling in part because adding process clauses “imparts no
patentability to the product resulting from the process.”94 In total,
the primary justification for following the Scripps court was to
follow precedent in the manner advocated by Judge Rich in his
Atlantic Thermoplastics dissent.95
2. District Court Rulings That Follow Atlantic Thermoplastics
By contrast, other district courts have chosen to follow Atlantic
Thermoplastics.96 The Tropix court agreed with the rationale of
Atlantic Thermoplastics more than any other district court.97 The
decision in Tropix was a memorandum of controlling law on the
scope of product-by-process claims at issue in the suit.98 The court
recognized the confused state of the law and decided to “apply the
90
Aventis Pharms., 372 F. Supp. 2d 430; Mannington Mills, 218 F. Supp. 2d 594; Trs.
of Columbia Univ., 126 F. Supp. 2d 16; DeKalb Genetics Corp., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
14275.
91
Aventis Pharms., 372 F. Supp. 2d at 433.
92
Id. at 437 n.4.
93
Trs. of Columbia Univ., 126 F. Supp. 2d at 32 (“Until the Scripps decision is rejected
by a hearing en banc, it is the precedential decision.”); DeKalb Genetics Corp., 1997 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 14275, at *6 (“Accordingly, applying the direct conflict rule, the court will
apply Scripps in the present case.”).
94
Mannington Mills, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 599. Note, however, that this statement is not
at odds with Atlantic Thermoplastics. There the court held that process terms are read
into the claim only for purposes of determining infringement, not patentability.
95
Atl. Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp., 974 F.2d 1279, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
96
Kennametal, Inc. v. Cerametal s.a.r.l., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25284 (E.D. Mich.
2001); Tropix, Inc. v. Lumigen, Inc., 825 F. Supp. 7 (D. Mass. 1993); Fairfax Dental Ltd.
v. Sterling Optical Corp., 808 F. Supp. 326 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
97
Tropix, 825 F. Supp. 7.
98
Id.
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rule which [appeared] to be most consonant with the main stream
of existing authority and the purpose of the governing statute.”99
After a thorough review of product-by-process claim
jurisprudence,100 the court held that Judge Newman’s belief in
Scripps that there should be symmetry between claim construction
for patentability and infringement “[did] not appear to be
supported by any authority, given the different functions of each
institution.”101 The court finally concluded that it would follow
Atlantic Thermoplastics because “even in the confused state of the
record . . . a majority of the judges of the Federal Circuit would
rule that Atlantic states the controlling law.”102 Other courts have
also ruled that Atlantic Thermoplastics is controlling precedent
when a process step was added as a claim limitation during
prosecution103 and when interpreting a hypothetical product-byprocess claim as a way to apply the Hypothetical Claim Test104 of
the Doctrine of Equivalents.105
F. SmithKline Beecham v. Apotex
In this recent case, SmithKline Beecham sued Apotex for
infringing its patent for the drug Paxil (whose chemical name is
paroxetine).106 The district court granted summary judgment for
99

Id. at 8.
Id. at 8–10.
101
Id. at 10.
102
Id.
103
See Kennametal, Inc. v. Cerametal s.a.r.l., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25284, at *33–34
(E.D. Mich. 2001) (bolstering support for using Atlantic Thermoplastics because of
Supreme Court precedent based on prosecution history estoppel).
104
“The Doctrine of Equivalents allows a patent owner to hold as infringement a
product or process that does not correspond to the literal terms of a patent’s claim but
performs substantially the same function in substantially the same way to obtain the same
result as the claimed subject matter.” CHISUM, supra note 6, § 18.04. “It is well settled
law that a patentee cannot assert a range of equivalents that encompasses the prior art.
To test this limit, the notion of a hypothetical claim may be useful. A hypothetical claim
may be constructed to literally cover the accused device. If such a claim would be
unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 or 103, then the patentee has overreached, and the
accused device is noninfringing as a matter of law.” Interactive Pictures Corp. v. Infinite
Pictures, Inc., 274 F.3d 1371, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). These patent
doctrines will not be discussed further because they are well outside the scope of this
Note.
105
Fairfax Dental Ltd. v. Sterling Optical Corp., 808 F. Supp. 326 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
106
SmithKline Beecham v. Apotex, 439 F.3d 1312, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
100
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Apotex, holding that the patent at issue was anticipated by a
previous patent held by SmithKline.107 The patent at issue claimed
the compound paroxetine, but did not define it in terms of its
structural characteristics, instead claiming the compound as the
end result of the process required to make the pill.108 The prior art
reference was an invalid patent109 obtained by SmithKline that
covered paroxetine as a compound without any reference to
process steps.110
After surveying the controversy over the Scripps and Atlantic
Thermoplastics decisions, the court stated: “Regardless of how
broadly or narrowly one construes a product-by-process claim, it is
clear that such claims are always to a product, not a process.”111
After a survey of the relevant C.C.P.A. and Supreme Court
decisions, the court held:
As this history of cases from the Supreme Court, our court,
and our predecessor court make clear, anticipation by an
earlier product patent cannot be avoided by claiming the
107

Id. at 1314–15.
The two claims at issue in the litigation were: Claim 1. A pharmaceutical
composition in tablet form containing paroxetine, produced on a commercial scale by a
process which comprises the steps of:
a) dry admixing paroxetine and excipients in a mixer to form a mixture; or
b) dry admixing paroxetine and excipients, compressing the resulting
combination into a slug material or roller compacting the resulting combination
into a strand material, and milling the prepared material into a free flowing
mixture; and
c) compressing the mixture into tablets.
Claim 2. A pharmaceutical composition in tablet form according to claim 1 containing an
amount of paroxetine selected from 10 mg, 20 mg, 30 mg, 40 mg and 50 mg, wherein the
amount of paroxetine is expressed as the free base, produced on a commercial scale by a
process which comprises the steps of:
a) dry admixing paroxetine and excipients in a mixer to form a mixture; or
b) dry admixing paroxetine and excipients, compressing the resulting
combination into a slug material or roller compacting the resulting combination
into a strand material, and milling the prepared material into a free flowing
mixture; and
c) compressing the mixture into tablets using a single punch or rotary tablet
machine. Id. at 1314.
109
The court noted that invalid patents still constitute prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)
as of the date the patent is published. Id. at 1317 n.5.
110
Id. at 1313.
111
Id. at 1317.
108
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same product more narrowly in a product-process claim. It
makes no difference here whether the ’944 patent’s
product-by-process claims are construed broadly to cover
the product made by any process or narrowly to cover only
the product made by a dry admixing process. Either way,
anticipation by an earlier product disclosure (which
disclosed the product itself) cannot be avoided. While the
process set forth in the product-by-process claim may be
new, that novelty can only be captured by obtaining a
process claim.
We agree with the district court’s
conclusion that the ’723 patent disclosure anticipated the
identical product claimed by the ’944 patent even though
that product was produced by an allegedly novel process.112
The court then disregarded an argument that there was a
substantive difference between the product in the patent at issue (a
purified tablet form of paroxetine) and the prior art patent
(paroxetine with an impurity) because it was insufficiently
developed by the appellant’s brief.113 Therefore, the court
affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment.114
Outvoted as a member of the three-judge panel, Judge Newman
filed a dissenting opinion.115 On the whole, she echoed many of
the same themes as her dissenting opinion in Atlantic
Thermoplastics.116 For one, she rejected the “one-type-fits-all
pigeonholes for claims, even for claims containing process
limitations.”117 Though she did not explicitly revive her tripartite
scheme from Atlantic Thermoplastics, her dissent in SmithKline is
logically consistent.118 She believed that the product claimed by
112

Id. at 1318–19.
Id. at 1320.
114
Id. at 1321.
115
Id. at 1321–25 (Newman, J., dissenting).
116
Atl. Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp., 974 F.2d 1279, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
(Newman, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc).
117
SmithKline Beecham, 439 F.3d at 1322.
118
See Atl. Thermoplastics, 974 F.2d at 1284. In this opinion, Judge Newman set out a
tripartite scheme of claim construction: “(1) when the product is new and unobvious, but
is not capable of independent definition; (2) when the product is old or obvious, but the
process is new; (3) when the product is new and unobvious, but has a process-based
limitation (e.g. a ‘molded’ product).” Id. Since Judge Newman thought that this form of
113
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SmithKline was a novel one, namely a tablet form of paroxetine
that reduces a particular type of impurity.119 She also concluded
that the issue was sufficiently preserved on appeal.120 Therefore,
she would have reversed the district court’s grant of summary
judgment and remanded the case because she determined that the
process steps in the claim made the product itself novel and
patentable.121
After the panel ruling, the entire Federal Circuit rejected a
petition for a rehearing en banc, with three out of eleven active
judges on the court voting instead to grant rehearing.122 Both
Judge Newman and Judge Rader filed dissents, with Judge Gajarsa
signing onto both opinions.123 Judge Newman stated:
Scripps accommodates the situation where the product is
novel and complex and cannot be described other than by
the way it was made, while Atlantic Thermoplastics deals
with a product whose production requires use of a certain
process, whether or not the product itself is novel.
In view of the apparent uncertainty within the patent
community as to the distinction between such situations, it
is time for this court to interpret the law with one voice.124
Judge Rader was less sanguine about whether a direct conflict
existed in product-by-process claim construction jurisprudence:
This court’s decision in Smithkline Beecham Corp. v.
Apotex Corp. expands on the existing confusion by
suggesting that the specific language of the claims is not
relevant to anticipation. That additional confusion does a
disservice to this court’s jurisprudence. Without doubt, this

paroxetine was a new and unobvious product, she classified it in the first group of
product-by-process claims.
119
SmithKline Beecham, 439 F.3d at 1322.
120
Id. at 1325.
121
Id. at 1324.
122
SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 453 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
123
Id.
124
Id. at 1347.
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court’s product-by-process law contains an apparent
conflict.125

II. THE DEFICIENCIES OF THE CURRENT LAW OF
PRODUCT-BY-PROCESS CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
The morass that the Federal Circuit finds itself in with regard
to claim construction of product-by-process claims begs for a
better approach. This Part analyzes the problems with claim
construction in the product-by-process context and critiques the
approaches of the Federal Circuit.
A. Product-by-Process Claims Are Doubly Troublesome
The Federal Circuit has in recent years debated the proper role
of district court judges, juries and the standard of review in claim
construction.126 Much of this law is still subject to revision,
leaving district courts unable to reduce the rate of reversal on claim
construction.127 The lack of agreement on the standard for claim
construction is only amplified when courts have to examine a
product-by-process claim.
When district courts construe a simple product or process
claim, trial judges have to closely examine every clause of the
claim to determine what the invention protected by the patent
actually is.128 The claims are also read in light of the specification
125

Id. at 1348 (citations omitted). Note that Judge Rader was the judge who wrote the
opinion in Atlantic Thermoplastics that created the conflicting authority within the
Federal Circuit. Atl. Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp., 970 F.2d 834 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
(Rader, J.). Judge Rader also voted against a rehearing en banc of that same case by the
Federal Circuit. Atl. Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp., 974 F.2d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
(Rader, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc).
126
See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct.
1332 (2006); Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Markman
v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
127
Compare Moore, supra note 14, at 239, with Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court
Judges Equipped to Resolve Patent Cases?, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 14 (2001) (Prof.
Moore, now Judge Moore of the Federal Circuit, completed two studies of claim
construction reversals. The first study found a 27% rate of verdicts reversed or vacated
during the period 1996–2000, while the second study found a 29.7% rate of
reversal/vacation for the period 1996–2003.).
128
See In re Wilson, 424 F.2d 1382, 1385 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
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because the specification explains the invention in “plain” English,
helping patent examiners, attorneys in an infringement action and
courts interpret the claims.129 This is a difficult process, so much
so that a recent study found that the Federal Circuit, upon de novo
review of all claim constructions at the trial court level, has held
that 34.5% of all such claim constructions have been wrongly
construed at the trial court level.130 If one believes that process
steps should not always be read into the claims, then one has to
evaluate what the invention actually is from the process used to
make it.131 It only makes sense that if one wants to describe what
something is, describing how you made it is an inferior way to do
so. If one incorporates the process steps into the claim, little
progress is made, because the first step in examining the claims
will still always be what the product actually is.132 For that, there
is the same problem as when the process steps do not limit the
claim. It only makes things simpler because one can now also
examine part of the claim in the same way that courts examine
process claims.
As discussed in Part II, the Courts have disagreed over both the
scope and the standard of allowability for product-by-process
claims.133 The main reason why the courts cannot seem to agree
on a single rule in each context is that sometimes the process steps
seem more important for figuring out what the product is, and
sometimes the process steps seem less important for making that
determination. When courts regard the process steps as more
important, they tend to come to the same conclusion as Judge
Newman and find that there are good reasons for treating productby-process claims differently based on the novelty of the
product.134 Alternatively, when process steps are less important,
courts typically construe these patents narrowly by using the
process steps as claim limitations and requiring the Rule of
129

See Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 397 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
Moore, supra note 14, at 239.
131
Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1583 (Fed. Cir.
1991) (citing In re Brown for the proposition that “in product-by-process claims the
patentability of the product must be established independent of the process”).
132
See SmithKline Beecham v. Apotex, 439 F.3d 1312, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
133
See supra Part II.
134
See Atl. Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp., 974 F.2d 1279, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
130
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Necessity.135 Since courts have disagreed over the scope and the
standard for allowability of product-by-process claims for at least
the last 40 years,136 it is clear that courts are ill-equipped to handle
the product-by-process claims in every situation except when that
is the only way the invention may be claimed.
B. The Indistinctness of Claim Description in Product-by-Process
Claims
One consideration about all of these claims that is
insufficiently addressed by all of the courts that have taken up the
issue of product-by-process claims is the distinct claiming
requirement. Any patent applicant must conclude his patent
application “with one or more claims particularly pointing out and
distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards
as his invention.”137 This requirement is located in the patent
statute for two reasons: to provide notice to those who may
practice similar inventions and to make the analysis easier for
judges and patent examiners when determining the scope of the
claims.138 Claim distinctiveness is analyzed “always in light of the
teachings of the prior art and of the particular application
disclosure as it would be interpreted by one possessing the
ordinary level of skill in the pertinent art.”139 Recent decisions
have tended to focus on the specific meaning of individual words
in a claim.140
135

See In re Hughes, 496 F.2d 1216, 1219 (C.C.P.A. 1974) (“While we recognize that
several structural or characterizing terms derive from processes or methods and that their
use in a claim will not prevent it from being considered to be a true product claim, we do
not believe that the emphasized language in claim 8 can be considered to be anything
other than a description of the shake in terms of the process by which it was made.”
(footnote omitted)).
136
See, e.g., Atl. Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp. 970 F.2d 834 (Fed. Cir. 1992),
reh’g en banc denied, 974 F.2d 1279 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Scripps, 927 F.2d 1565; In re
Hughes, 496 F.2d 1216 (C.C.P.A. 1974); In re Pilkington, 411 F.2d 1345 (C.C.P.A.
1969); In re Johnson, 394 F.2d 591 (C.C.P.A. 1968); In re Steppan, 394 F.2d 1013
(C.C.P.A. 1967).
137
35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).
138
CHISUM, supra note 6, § 8.03.
139
In re Moore, 439 F.2d 1232, 1235 (C.C.P.A. 1971) (footnote omitted).
140
See, e.g., Personalized Media Comm’ns, LLC v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 161 F.3d
696, 705 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Johnson & Johnson
Orthopaedics, Inc., 976 F.2d 1559, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
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The notice requirement tells possible users of patented products
or processes what they can and cannot do.141 This is tremendously
important for the efficiency of the patent marketplace.142 The
typical analogy for patent claims is that they are akin to a land
deed that tells others the boundary of their land.143 Taking the
analogy further, imagine that instead of a fence, you had a fogmaking machine that spit out condensation over a ten-foot wide
boundary between properties. The two owners would either leave
the boundary land unused or risk a lawsuit for trespass. Either
result creates significant economic inefficiencies.144
Product-by-process claims make it extremely difficult to claim
the invention with the certainty most patentees would expect. First
of all, even the Federal Circuit cannot agree on a clear standard for
what these claims actually mean.145 This creates tremendous
uncertainty for anyone who wants to innovate in a technological
area where a product-by-process patent exists.146 Second, as
emphasized supra in Section A, when a product claim uses process
language, all the linguistic tools that courts and patent examiners
bring to bear are much more difficult to apply.147
One reason courts may have been unwilling to champion an
approach that emphasized the lack of distinctiveness of productby-process claims is that the claims themselves are not necessarily
141

See McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U.S. 419, 424 (1891) (“The object of the patent law in
requiring the patentee to ‘particularly point out and distinctly claim the part,
improvement, or combination which he claims as his invention or discovery’ is not only
to secure to him all to which he is entitled, but to apprise the public of what is still open
to them.”).
142
FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY ch. 1, at 29 (Oct. 2003) available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf (last visited Sept. 26, 2006) [hereinafter
FTC REPORT].
143
Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 510 (1917).
144
FTC REPORT, supra note 142, ch. 1, at 29.
145
SmithKline Beecham v. Apotex, 439 F.3d 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Atl.
Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp., 974 F.2d 1279 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Scripps Clinic &
Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
146
See Festo v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki, 535 U.S. 722, 732 (2002) (“If
competitors cannot be certain about a patent’s extent, they may be deterred from
engaging in legitimate manufactures outside its limits, or they may invest by mistake in
competing products that the patent secures.”).
147
See supra Part III.A.
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ambiguous on their face.148 However, this argument misses the
point because defining a product through process claims requires a
significant inferential step. The only direct analysis of a productby-process patent claim would be evaluating the novelty of the
process. As a result, there is a serious bootstrapping problem
because the public then has to depend much more heavily on the
specification to actually know what the product is, thus inverting
the role of the two sections of a patent application.
C. Problems with the Product-Focused Approach
Much of product-by-process claim construction precedent can
be summarized as falling into two camps. One, exemplified by the
Scripps approach, looks to the novelty of the product and does not
read process limitations into the claim.149 The other, exemplified
by the Atlantic Thermoplastics decision, looks largely to the
process limitations in the claim to define it.150 This Section will
examine the problems with the product-focused approach and why
it fails to adequately address the problems with the distinctiveness
of product-by-process claims.
The first and most glaring problem with focusing on the
product to the exclusion of the process is that it ignores the plain
meaning of the claim. Claims are used to define and limit the
scope of patent protection.151 It would seem that if one is going to
use process terms in the claim itself, that should limit the scope of
patent protection to the process used to make the patent.152
Normally, for a product patent, the specification will discuss the
method by which the product is made, otherwise known as the
148

See, e.g., In re Hughes, 496 F.2d 1216, 1218 (C.C.P.A. 1974) (“We cannot agree
with the solicitor that defining a product in terms of process makes the language of the
claims imprecise or indefinite. Their scope, if anything, is more definite in reciting a
novel product made by a specific process, assuming, of course, that the process is clearly
defined. It does not create a definiteness problem under § 112.”).
149
Scripps, 927 F.2d at 1583.
150
Atl. Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp., 970 F.2d 834, 846–47 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
151
See, e.g., Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 419 (1908)
(“[T]he claims measure the invention.”).
152
See, e.g., Lemelson v. United States, 752 F.2d 1538, 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“It is
also well settled that each element of a claim is material and essential, and that in order
for a court to find infringement, the plaintiff must show the presence of every element or
its substantial equivalent in the accused device.”).
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Enablement Requirement.153 When patent applicants use this type
of claiming, it inverts the whole purpose of the claim in patent law.
Instead of using the claim to limit the invention, now the patent
applicant is using the specification in tandem with a description of
the process to help tell the patent office and the engineering
community what the product actually is.
The requirement that claims give notice of the invention to the
public creates unique problems when process steps are read out of
product-by-process claims. The usual justification for using a
product-by-process claim is that it gives the inventor a chance to
claim the invention without completely knowing what the product
is.154 But if the inventor doesn’t know what the product is, how is
the rest of the public supposed to know what the product is from
the process steps mentioned in the invention? Ignoring the process
steps in an invention will only encourage the proliferation of
patents that can be used as a way to litigate rather than innovate.
The dispute between the Scripps and Atlantic Thermoplastics
courts have done little to help make the scope of product-byprocess patents any clearer.
D. Problems with the Approach of Atlantic Thermoplastics
Much of the problems that arise from the Atlantic
Thermoplastics decision are not from the content of the holding,
but because the court made the law of product-by-process claims
completely unclear.155 While the bulk of the Supreme Court and
C.C.P.A. precedent was on that panel’s side, courts have long been
muddled in their approach to product-by-process claims—
something not entirely admitted by the Atlantic Thermoplastics
court.156 However, the Scripps holding was clear, and there was
some support for it in cases both from the Supreme Court and the
C.C.P.A. Thus, the panel could have distinguished the Scripps
holding in some way or stated that they were obligated to follow
153
See Mark A. Lemley, The Changing Meaning of Patent Claim Terms, 104 MICH. L.
REV. 101, 106–07 (2005).
154
See Atl. Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp., 974 F.2d 1279, 1283 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
(Newman, J., dissenting).
155
Atl. Thermoplastics, 970 F.2d 834.
156
Id.
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the holding of Scripps. Instead, the panel vehemently disagreed
with it.157 Effectively, the court sacrificed clarity of the law for a
favorable outcome in one case. The members of the panel also
refused to revisit the issue in an en banc decision, which may well
have cleared up the dispute once and for all.158
The holding in Atlantic Thermoplastics has only confused
district courts that have had to construe product-by-process
claims.159 Some courts agreed with the way that Atlantic
Thermoplastics addressed precedent, finding that the Atlantic
Thermoplastics court correctly based its decision on prior Supreme
Court precedent.160
Even a panel of the Federal Circuit itself in the SmithKline
Beecham case refused to weigh in on the dispute.161 It appears to
reflect the practice of common law appellate courts to attempt to
decide cases on the narrowest grounds and do everything possible
to avoid overruling precedent.162 Unfortunately, since the product
itself was not novel,163 this case was not an appropriate candidate
for en banc review because the case really did not depend on
157

Id. at 839 n.2.
See Atl. Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp., 974 F.2d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (Rader,
J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc).
159
See Trs. of Columbia Univ. v. Roche Diagnostics, GmbH, 126 F. Supp. 2d 16, 32 (D.
Mass. 2000) (“Plainly, the law on this issue is in a state of uncertainty. By denying the
rehearing en banc, not only are lower courts left with little guidance, but so are the
inventors and investors of the biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries who must
make research and development decisions not knowing how much protection is available
to a claim for a novel biological or chemical product.”); DeKalb Genetics Corp. v.
Northrup King Co., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14275, at *5–6 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (“It cannot be
questioned that there is a direct conflict between the rule enunciated in Scripps and the
one set forth in Atlantic Thermoplastics.”); Tropix, Inc. v. Lumigen, Inc. 825 F. Supp. 7,
8 (D. Mass. 1993) (“Unfortunately, the judges of the Federal Circuit Court are in open
disagreement on the point, making such prediction hazardous.”).
160
AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac, 234 F. Supp. 2d 711, 739, n.1 (S.D. Ohio 2002).
161
SmithKline Beecham v. Apotex, 439 F.3d 1312, 1316–17 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
162
See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992) (“Even when
the decision to overrule a prior case is not, as in the rare, latter instance, virtually
foreordained, it is common wisdom that the rule of stare decisis is not an ‘inexorable
command’. . . Rather, when this Court reexamines a prior holding, its judgment is
customarily informed by a series of prudential and pragmatic considerations designed to
test the consistency of overruling a prior decision with the ideal of the rule of law, and to
gauge the respective costs of reaffirming and overruling a prior case.”).
163
SmithKline Beecham, 439 F.3d at 1317.
158
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whether the process steps were read into the claim.164 However,
the only action that will give lower courts some real guidance is an
en banc decision by the Federal Circuit, review by the Supreme
Court or a new statute by Congress. As of July 30, 2006, there is
no plan to include any provision regarding product-by-process
claims in the most recent round of statutory patent reforms.165
III. BACK TO THE FUTURE: RE-EMPHASIZING DISTINCTIVE
CLAIMING AND THE RULE OF NECESSITY
The solution to this labyrinth of conflicting precedent and
unclear claiming schemes is twofold. First, the patent office
should only accept product-by-process claims where there is no
other alternative way at the time of filing to claim the product. The
burden should be on the applicant to show that he must claim in
this manner. Second, courts must construe product-by-process
claims as limited by the process because that is the only way to
solve the issue of definiteness and maintain the traditional role of
claims in a patent. This part will argue for these reforms and also
analyze foreign approaches to product-by-process claims, which
largely support this thesis.
A. The Rule of Necessity Should Be Revived
The Rule of Necessity requires that patent applicants only
claim using product-by-process language when there is no other
way to claim the invention.166 This rule should be re-emphasized
because to do otherwise severely limits the ability of third parties
to have a reasonable expectation of what the patent actually
covers.167 It also makes patent claims more clear because it

164

See id. at 1319 n.7.
The most recent bill to comprehensively amend the patent laws will probably not
pass during the 109th Congress. Dennis Crouch, Patent Reform: Issa’s Litigation Pilot
Gains Support (HR 5418), July 28, 2006, PATENTLY-O, http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/
2006/07/patent_reform_i.html; see Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong.
(2005).
166
CHISUM, supra note 6, § 8.05[2][a].
167
See In re Hughes, 496 F.2d 1216, 1218 (C.C.P.A. 1974) (“If there is a basis for the
[Rule of Necessity], it resides in the fact that it may be more difficult to determine from a
165
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resolves much of the ambiguity over whether to define the
invention in terms of the claims, instead of indirectly through the
specification.
As discussed supra in Part II, Section B of this Note, defining
an invention in terms of the process used to make it is an inferior
way to claim because it forces courts to make inferential steps that
invite contradictory opinions.168 The Rule of Necessity would
address these concerns in many of these situations because it
would limit the number of patents that incorporate product-byprocess claims. There is no Constitutional right to obtain a patent
for an invention that is merely difficult to claim without using the
language of the process used to make it. If the invention is a useful
product, there is no reason why the applicant cannot claim it in
means-plus-function language as another way to avoid the
structural requirements of traditional product claim language.169
Also, if the product is really that difficult to characterize in
structural terms, a patent examiner should be highly skeptical that
the applicant actually possesses the invention that he claims. This
may be one way to alter the substantive law of patents to
encourage fewer frivolous patents.
Also, by limiting product-by-process claims to those that can
be claimed in no other way, the process of interpreting the claims
becomes easier by shifting the primary focus of the scope of the
patent back to its claims. If there are ways to define an invention
outside of claim language, courts will inevitably depend on the
specification more heavily to describe the invention. But if the
Rule of Necessity is followed, then courts will have to closely
examine the process clauses in the claim because there is no other
way to understand what the invention actually is. In sum, the Rule
of Necessity would set up the right incentives for interpretation of
claim language, imparting greater stability to the law.

product-by-process claim what product is covered thereby. One cannot read the words of
the claim on an article unless he is able to find out how the article was made.”).
168
See supra Part III.B.
169
35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 6 (2006).
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B. Product-by-Process Claims Should Be Limited by the Process
Steps Listed in the Claims
Product-by-process claims should be limited to the process that
is included in the language of the claims because it would also
improve the definiteness of the claims. This rule would maintain
the traditional role of patent claims as defining and limiting the
invention.
Claims are the most crucial part of any patent—the foundation
of the patent system—because they define the invention for
comparison to the prior art for validity determinations and for
comparison to the acts of the accused infringer.170 It is an oftrepeated maxim that all claim language (except usually the
preamble) serves to define and limit the invention.171 Product-byprocess claims provide a uniquely difficult problem because their
very nature subverts this usual arrangement. After SmithKline
Beecham, these claims require courts and patent examiners to
examine the scope of the claims first by inferring what the product
that the patent seeks to obtain protection for actually is.172 If that
product is novel, then claim construction depends on whether the
Atlantic Thermoplastics or the Scripps decision should be
followed.173 One way to make these claims more definite is to use
the language of the claim to define the invention. If the patentee
does not know what product she has created from the process to
define the claim, it is highly debatable that the notice function of
Folding process limitations into
claiming is satisfied.174
infringement determinations will help make patent claims much
clearer.
Another reason why process terms should be included in
limiting the claims is that they restore the traditional role of the
specification. The specification is a crucial part of any patent
because it helps patent examiners and courts interpret the patent
170

See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 980 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(“The written description part of the specification itself does not delimit the right to
exclude. That is the function and purpose of claims.”).
171
Id.
172
See SmithKline Beecham v. Apotex, 439 F.3d 1312, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
173
See id. at 1319 n.7.
174
CHISUM, supra note 6, § 8.03.
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and it serves to inform the public of the invention.175 Without
reading process terms of a claim into the scope of the claim, the
process terms become simply a method of understanding what the
invention actually is. Structuring a patent in this way removes any
need to have a claim in the first place. Requiring the process terms
to actually limit the invention would restore the traditional balance
between the specification and the claims.
Another reason why process terms should be read into
otherwise novel products for the purposes of infringement is that
patent claims should be defined in the narrowest scope possible in
the infringement context.176 This traditional method of interpreting
claims in infringement suits is an important way of making sure
that patentees cannot exclude others from making, using or selling
products that they did not themselves invent.177 Making sure that
process terms are read into the scope of the claims for infringement
would reinforce this vital patent doctrine.
Limiting claims to the process included in the claim for
purposes of infringement is complementary to the Rule of
Necessity. The Rule of Necessity strongly discourages the use of
product-by-process claiming, both when attempting to procure a
patent and when examining the validity of the patent. Reading
process limitations into the scope of the claim works from the
opposite end of the patent statutory scheme, that of infringement.
Because these claims are so difficult to interpret, every clue to
determine the scope of the claims is important. These two rules
serve the same master: increasing the distinctiveness of patent
claiming.
C. The Approach of Foreign Patent Law Supports this Reform
Even though many foreign patent law systems are more
properly grounded in a trade-based rationale than the “inducement

175

See 35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 1 (2000).
See Atl. Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp., 970 F.2d 834, 846 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
(“The PTO’s treatment of product-by-process claims as a product claim for patentability
is consistent with policies giving claims their broadest reasonable interpretation. That
same rule, however, does not apply in validity and infringement litigation.”).
177
See In re Zletz, 893 F.2d 319, 321 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
176
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to invent” rationale favored in the United States,178 the approach of
foreign patent systems to product-by-process claims is instructive
to this discussion. To summarize, the approaches in Europe and
Japan emphasize the Rule of Necessity, but are less clear on the
subject of the scope of product-by-process claims for infringement.
1. European Union
The European Patent Office’s179 (“E.P.O.”) approach to
product-by-process claims is restrictive with respect to the
permissibility of product-by-process claims, but expansive in its
view of infringement. The E.P.O. also explicitly asserts that
“[c]laims for products defined in terms of a process of manufacture
are allowable only if the products as such fulfil [sic] the
requirements for patentability. . .”180 But the E.P.O. also follows
the Rule of Necessity, after the International Flavors case.181 In
its Guidelines for Examination, the E.P.O. makes clear the scope of
product-by-process claims by stating, “[a] claim defining a product
in terms of a process is to be construed as a claim to the product as
such.”182 The E.P.O. is also obligated to follow Article 64(2) of
the European Patent Convention, which requires, “If the subjectmatter of the European patent is a process, the protection conferred
by the patent shall extend to the products directly obtained by such
178

See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
“The European Patent Office (EPO) grants European patents for the contracting
states to the European Patent Convention (EPC), which was signed in Munich on 5
October 1973 and entered into force on 7 October 1977. It is the executive arm of the
European Patent Organisation, an intergovernmental body set up under the EPC, whose
members are the EPC contracting states. The activities of the EPO are supervised by the
Organisation’s Administrative Council, composed of delegates from the contracting
states.” The European Patent Office, http://www.european-patent-office.org/epo/pubs/
brochure/ general/e/epo_general.htm.
180
Guidelines for Examination in the European Patent Office, European Patent Office,
pt. C., ch. III., ¶ 4.7b, available at http://www.european-patent-office.org/legal/gui_lines/
pdf_2005/part_c_e.pdf [hereinafter E.P.O. Guidelines].
181
Case T-150/82, Int’l Flavors & Fragrances, Inc., 1984 O.J. E.P.O. 309 (TBA 1984)
(“The Board takes the view that in order to minimise uncertainty, the form for a claim to
a patentable product as such defined in terms of a process of manufacture (i.e. ‘productby-process claims’) should be reserved for cases where the product cannot be
satisfactorily defined by reference to its composition, structure or some other testable
parameters.”).
182
E.P.O. Guidelines, Part C., Ch. III., ¶ 4.7b.
179
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process.”183 So, in the E.P.O., there really isn’t the same rationale
for allowing product-by-process claims because process claims
already supply the scope of coverage necessary to provide for
product-by-process claims as such claims exist in the United States
and the United Kingdom.184
2. United Kingdom
In the U.K. (a European Patent Convention member state), the
most recent authoritative opinion on product-by-process claims is a
decision written by Lord Hoffmann on behalf of the House of
Lords.185 In Kirin-Amgen, Amgen held a European patent for
making erythropoietin using recombinant DNA technology and
sued for infringement.186 Two of the claims in Amgen’s patent
were product-by-process claims.187 The defendant asserted that the
claims were invalid for anticipation.188 On the question of
invalidity for the first claim, the court held that since the patentee
could depend on a process claim and Article 64(2) of the European
Patent Convention to gain protection, the claim was invalid
because it violated the Rule of Necessity.189 For the second claim,
the court held that the claim was invalid for “insufficiency” (the
U.K. analog to the enablement requirement in the U.S.) because
the specification did not tell the public which method of
purification would produce the purified erythropoietin.190 So,
while the court did not have the occasion to determine the scope of
the claims for infringement, it did uphold the Rule of Necessity in
European patent law.

183
European Patent Convention, art. 64(2), available at http://www.european-patentoffice.org/legal/epc/e/ar64.html#A64.
184
See Kirin-Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Ltd., [2004] UKHL 46, at para.
90 (U.K.).
185
Kirin-Amgen, [2004] UKHL 46.
186
Id. at para. 1.
187
Id. at paras. 14–15.
188
Id. at para. 2.
189
See id. at para. 101.
190
Id. at paras. 130–31.
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3. Japan
The Japanese Patent Office (“J.P.O.”) takes its own unique
approach to the patentability of product-by-process claims.191 The
J.P.O. has a two-part inquiry.192 A patent is clear enough for
patentability when “a person skilled in the art can conceive a
concrete product to be manufactured by such manufacturing
process by taking into consideration the common general
knowledge as of the filing. . .”193 But if it fails this form of a
reasonable inventor standard, it can still be patented if it “cannot be
properly identified unless defining the product by its
manufacturing process” and “the relation between the product to
be manufactured by such manufacturing process and the technical
standard as of the filing can be understood.”194 The Guidelines go
on to explain that “when the relation (difference) between the
product to be manufactured by such manufacturing process and
known products are shown with the experimental result or
theoretical explanation, etc., the relation with the technical
standard can be understood.”195 So in essence, the J.P.O. uses a
reasonable inventor standard coupled with a modified form of the
Rule of Necessity.
These examples from other well-developed patent systems are
useful to show alternative ways to address an extremely knotty
problem. These patent systems give strong support to the need in
the United States to revive the Rule of Necessity. However, they
do not definitively side with either the Scripps or Atlantic
Thermoplastics line of cases.
D. Ways Future Litigants Can Argue Around the Scripps and
Atlantic Thermoplastics Conflict
As evidenced from the preceding sections of this Note,
product-by-process claim construction precedent is extremely
191

Examination Guidelines for Patent and Utility Model, Japanese Patent Office, Part I.,
Ch. 1, § 2.2.2.1, available at http://www.jpo.go.jp/tetuzuki_e/t_tokkyo_e/Guidelines/
PartI-1.pdf.
192
Id.
193
Id.
194
Id.
195
Id.
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contradictory and bright line rules are difficult to determine.
However, litigants will continue to argue in Markman hearings
over the scope of product-by-process claims, without the benefit of
a precedential decision that clearly informs the parties what the
rules of the game actually are. This section addresses the types of
arguments that litigants may make to distinguish their case.
Now that the SmithKline decision is available to litigants,196 the
most obvious way that parties will attempt to avoid the conflicting
decisions in Scripps197 and Atlantic Thermoplastics198 is by
latching onto the language in SmithKline stating, “[r]egardless of
how broadly or narrowly one construes a product-by-process
claim, it is clear that such claims are always to a product, not a
process.”199 Therefore, in lawsuits where anticipation is at issue,
like in SmithKline, the patentee should try to argue that the product
implied by the claims is new compared to the prior art without any
analysis of the process used to make it. In some ways, this is
simply verbal trickery because it does not really solve anything
except giving courts a way to ignore the decisions in Scripps and
Atlantic Thermoplastics. One still has to interpret claims to a
product based on what the process terms in the claim say because
that is how the invention is defined. However, there was room for
the panel in SmithKline to agree with that argument, but only Judge
Newman thought that the issue was fully reserved on appeal200 and
that the product was actually new.201
The real essence of the dispute between the decisions in
Scripps and Atlantic Thermoplastics is: how will the courts
construe product-by-process claims for the purposes of
infringement? One tactic is to argue that the decisions are not
actually in conflict, similar to the argument that Judge Newman
made in her SmithKline dissent.202 In this line of reasoning, one
196

SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 439 F.3d 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir.
1991).
198
Atl. Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp., 970 F.2d 834 (Fed. Cir. 1992), reh’g en
banc denied, 974 F.2d 1279 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
199
SmithKline Beecham, 439 F.3d at 1317.
200
Id. at 1324–25.
201
Id. at 1324.
202
Id. at 1323.
197
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would argue that the Scripps decision applies only to “true
product-by-process” claims, where the process is necessary to
define the invention because there is no other way to define it.203
If, instead, the litigant wanted to argue that the process terms
should limit the claim, that litigant would argue that it really is a
“product of the process” claim, where the court in Atlantic
Thermoplastics interpreted process terms as limiting the scope of
the invention.204 This argument uses Judge Newman’s distinction
between the different classes of claims in Scripps versus Atlantic
Thermoplastics, but leaves untouched the different standards from
the two cases. The danger in this tactic is that cogent dissents by
Judge Newman, rather than any Federal Court majority opinion,
provide the best support for this approach.205
Another way that a litigant might effectively navigate the
troubled waters of product-by-process jurisprudence is by arguing
that the en banc decision in Phillips v. AWH206 suggests that the
specification should be relied on more heavily when interpreting
the claims. As discussed earlier in this Note,207 product-by-process
claims almost inevitably lead to increased reliance on the
specification to determine the scope of the patent. While on one
hand, the court in the Phillips decision stated that “[i]t is a
‘bedrock principle’ of patent law that ‘the claims of a patent define
the invention to which the patentee is entitled the right to
exclude,’”208 on the other hand, the court re-emphasized the
importance of the specification in claim interpretation.209 Since
product-by-process claims are so difficult to interpret and the
disclosure in the specification is helpful to a litigant’s case, the
litigant should convince the court that the specification controls,
rather than getting pulled into an uncertain argument over whether
Scripps or Atlantic Thermoplastics applies.

203

Atl. Thermoplastics, 974 F.2d at 1282.
See id.
205
SmithKline Beecham, 439 F.3d at 1323; Atl. Thermoplastics, 974 F.2d at 1281–84
(Newman, J., dissenting the denial of rehearing en banc).
206
Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
207
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Unfortunately for savvy litigants, trial court forum shopping is
unlikely to pay dividends. Since the Atlantic Thermoplastics
decision was handed down, at least two identical U.S. District
Courts have discussed the conflicting law of product-by-process
claims. However, these two courts have either followed opposing
rules or distinguished the cases such that they did not have to
address the dispute. In the District of Massachusetts, the Tropix
court held that it would follow Atlantic Thermoplastics because it
reflected the opinion of the majority of the Federal Circuit and it
was more properly grounded in prior precedent.210 Also in the
District of Massachusetts, the Trustees of Columbia University
court did not treat the Tropix decision as controlling law and
applied Scripps because it was the prior precedent, controlling
under the Federal Circuit Rules.211 In the District of Delaware, the
Mannington Mills court applied Scripps,212 but a recent decision
also in Delaware distinguished its case from the conflict over
product-by-process claims based on the definition of claim terms
in the specification.213 This most recent decision did not even cite
Mannington Mills.214 Therefore, there is little hope that a litigant
will be able to find a forum where the court will predictably apply
either Atlantic Thermoplastics or Scripps.
IV. CONCLUSION
The history of product-by-process claim construction and use is
one of conflicting precedent. It is time for an authority such as the
en banc Federal Circuit to take up an appropriate case and decide
on a single rule. Because product-by-process claims are such an
inferior way to describe an invention, the Federal Circuit should
adopt a Rule of Necessity, requiring that patent applicants only use
product-by-process claims when necessary. The burden to show
210

See Tropix, Inc. v. Lumigen, Inc., 825 F. Supp. 7, 10 (D. Mass. 1993).
Trs. of Columbia Univ. v. Roche Diagnostics GmbH, 126 F. Supp. 2d 16, 32 (D.
Mass. 2000).
212
Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 594 (D.
Del. 2002).
213
Cryovac, Inc. v. Pechiney Plastic Packaging, Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19144,
at *13 (D. Del. 2006).
214
Cryovac, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19144.
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that product-by-process claims are necessary should be borne by
the patent applicant. The Federal Circuit should also hold that
process limitations should be read into every product-by-process
claim because the claims are indefinite. Process limitations also
make sense because it reaffirms the principle that the claims should
define the limits of the invention, not the specification. These
reforms would restore a sense of balance to the patent system by
limiting issued patents to the narrowest scope of invention for what
the applicant actually has invented.

